THE New Republic

1957—The Year The Piano Went Through the Floor

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NATO and Nuclear Weapons

By DEAN ACHESON

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Dear Mr. President . . . . . *J. Lincoln Paine*

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The Practice of Forbearance

An Essay on Freedom by Charles L. Black, Jr.

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Washington Wire

That Was 1957

WHEN HARRY TRUMAN was playing the piano one time in the White House the piano leg went through the floor. Investigation showed the hallowed edifice eaten by termites and spongy with dry rot. The place had to be torn down, re-built. That's what 1957 A.D. did to some of America's most hallowed illusions. It was the year the piano went through the floor.

Any way you look at it, 1957 was extraordinary. It began with an election result unparalleled in a century—one party winning the White House, the other the legislature. Party labels meant less than ever; new forces were at work. A transition was under way.

Congress met—and a second thing happened: a civil rights bill passed for the first time in 80 years. As a law it left a lot to be desired. But it passed. No filibuster. Why? Because new conditions existed, only partly understood but beginning to show themselves.

The ancient filibuster rule—the Senate's historic Rule 22—was threatened. That grew evident in 1957. As the Senate met, a drive to repeal began. It failed. But contrast the votes: in 1953 the attempt collapsed 70-22; in 1957 it was defeated by only 55-38, with three absentees (all for changing the rule) so the real sentiment was 55-41. In four years repeal strength had doubled. The South did not filibuster the civil rights bill after that because it dared not; it knew it would be the last filibuster. Look ahead 20 years and see where 1957 points here.

It was, too, the year the old Dixiecrat-GOP coalition stalled. This is the coalition which in one way or another has dominated Congress for years—at least in things that interested it.

The old Farm Bloc also weakened in 1957. This is another ancient juggernaut of a lobby; in its heyday the strongest lobby in Washington. But it couldn't oust the obstinate, self-righteous Mormon Apostle Benson, who met it head on, though it could bloody his head and hold him to a tie. Why was the bloc weakening? Not because of Ezra Taft Benson. It was because of other intricate developments, because of time and changing attitudes: fewer farmers, more city consumers, the technical explosion of agriculture, the anger of taxpayers made to support the price of things they had to buy, the final division and conflict within the bloc itself between cattle men, dairy men, cotton and grain growers. The great Farm Bloc still looked impressive but the veneer was coming unglued.

Go Take a Jump

THAT WASN'T all, either. A.D. 1957 saw Northern Democrats telling the South more loudly than before to go jump off the roof if it wanted to. Inviting them to jump. The new Advisory Council of the Democratic Party spoke clearly, whatever its Congressional leaders did. Here again the finger pointing to the future. Jump off the roof? What, said Dixie Senators aghast, and lose seniority rights in Congress, committee chairmanships and all the other appurtenances of power! Truman had won without the South. Many Northern Democrats ardently wanted the South to jump. Significantly Southern leaders began changing tune. Could they go to the Supreme Court? Not with the unanimous segregation decision. To the Republicans? Not after Little Rock. The year 1957 didn't settle anything, but it laid bare the problem.

It was the first year, too, that the 22nd Amendment had political effect. For the first time in 180 years America had a constitutional lame duck President. It showed itself in small, subtle ways: the role of Nixon, the decline of Eisenhower. Back in 1953 Eisenhower was applauded enthusiastically 55 times in his first State of the Union speech; in 1957 only 5 times, tepidly. His blown-up image began to take smaller and more realistic proportions now that the forces of business, conservatism and the status quo, which operate through the communications media and to whom he had given two splendid victories, found the old soldier of diminishing value. The old soldier, who had preached the homely platitudes of Abilene with fervor and conviction, who epitomized the national wish for security, prosperity and sanctity —who hated the political drudgery of the White House and reduced the Presidency to baby-sitting, fumbled awkwardly over his budget with angry George Humphrey and could not understand what was happening.

End of Two Eras

WELL, YOU KNOW what I am going to say next. Yes, the year 1957 ended this other era, too.

Herbert Hoover in 1929 said, "Prosperity is just around the corner." Dwight Eisenhower in 1957 said, "The satellite . . . does not raise my apprehension one iota." End two eras. The great drama sweeps on—the dawn of the space age led by Russia not the United States. . . . What is that odd slant to the piano, Mamie?

The story moves ahead, the Administration attempt to make it seem nothing had happened, the gathering anxiety over the country, the hasty call for a NATO conference, the second satellite, the decision to make the chins-up speeches, the first speech of reassurance with dummy props of nose cone and MIT president Killian, the second speech—now in graver, duller tones with recognition of dangers not admitted before—the "chill" at the airport, the stroke, the gallant trip to Paris, the attempt to pump up the miniscule results there into another press triumph like that which hailed the "Geneva Spirit" of 1954.

But it was not 1954. It was 1957, the year of transition, the year when new political forces stirred beneath the surface, old coalitions were toppling, when Americans were stunned, chastened and confused into a mood of salutary humiliation after five years of unparalleled complacency—and began searching subconsciously for a different kind of leadership, a rail splitter, maybe, or a man with uptilted cigarette.

Yes, that was 1957 folks. The year the piano leg went through the floor.

T.R.B.

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The New Republic

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A Communication

► *Bargaining with the Russians*

SIRS:

THE *New Republic's* advice to a sputnik-struck administration, beset from all directions by Monday morning quarterbacks, is to climb back to a position of "strength" from which we can bargain. Unlike "the Admiral Radfords" the *NR* is not opposed in principle to negotiation

(Continued on page 23)

Little Ventured

MR. DULLES got what he wanted at Paris, and at a bargain: he could hardly have hoped for more than an agreement "in principle" governing the placement of IRBM's on the territory of our allies, when it must be at least a year and a half before they are ready, and when the military authorities have not completed their study and recommended where or how many missile sites should be established. In addition, obscured by the more sensational issue of the big missiles, his NATO nuclear weapons stockpile proposal was accepted almost without remark. Mr. Hanson Baldwin is not the only commentator to remark that what came out of the Conference on these purposes would have been achieved without a conference, in fact, was already as good as achieved when the Conference convened. And the price, considering the atmosphere, was remarkably low, in fact no more than another agreement in principle to renew disarmament negotiations with the Soviets—an agreement which the Russians forthwith scorned, as Mr. Dulles no doubt expected they would.

The avowed purpose of the Conference was to restore NATO's confidence, in other words a pep meeting akin to the President's "chins up" lectures at home. And in this regard also the meeting was not a failure. The patient feels a little better, and so perhaps he is a little better. There are even a few real gains to be recorded. Apparently the US missile offer included delivering the intermediate missiles, when they are ready, to those allies willing to receive them, lock, stock, and barrel. If this is so, and if substance can be put into the proposals designed to "stimulate a truly productive effort in the defense production field," it may mean some reduction of the waste implicit in competing secret programs of missile development and production, while at the same time—and as this journal recommended earlier—a real sharing of basic defense responsibility with our allies, who may expect to have in their own hands, at an earlier date than they can achieve by their own unaided efforts, the means of strategic delivery. The warheads will, of course, be retained in the NATO stockpiles, and under the control of American soldiers, so the responsibility of our allies will still be shared. But this was unavoidable and will continue to be the situation until the possession of A-bombs becomes more widely spread as the result of various national efforts, or until the Administration gets its courage up to go to Congress for permission to deliver nuclear warheads as well as missiles, and thus put a stop to *this* form of waste of our allies' resources.

As against these gains, however, it must be remarked with the utmost gravity (as the State Department says when it means business) that nowhere in the record is there any indication that the critical need for greater effort on the part of the allies themselves was even discussed. Perhaps something of this nature is hidden in the reference to the ministerial level military conference to be held early in 1957. But it would have been heartening, in view of all the talk about nuclear weapons of destruction, and no more than prudent, in view of the Bulganin letters and the proposals

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Ask Me No Questions . . .

PARIS, Dec. 18—The Atlantic alliance reached limited accord in principle tonight on the arming of West Europe with nuclear missiles . . .

–The New York Times

* * *

Question: Is it your position, sir, that there should be an agreement in principle on missile bases at the NATO meeting?

Dulles: No. I would not think so. I don't favor a great deal of these so-called "agreements in principle." I remember that my first important diplomatic experience was at the Paris peace conference of 1919. We largely used the French language and at that time whenever I was told that a proposition was accepted *en principe* I always felt discouraged because I knew it would probably never get anywhere.

–Press Conference, Dec. 10

* * *

Mr. Dulles is a disaster.

–Old Proverb

for the denuclearization of Central Europe, if there had been some promise that General Norstad might hope to receive the conventional forces he needs to fill out an adequate Western European defense.

It is true, of course, that the Conference was marked by the literary presence of two uninvited guests—the aforementioned Soviet Prime Minister and George F. Kennan. But it also seems to be true that by focusing attention upon the question of "negotiating with the Russians," and thereby diverting attention *away* from NATO's own complex internal problems, these gentlemen actually made Mr. Dulles' task easier for him. Despite his repeated statements of skepticism, including an untimely appearance in the issue of *Life* magazine that appeared during the Conference itself, regarding the merit of such negotiations, it was no trick for Mr. Dulles to present himself as actually favoring negotiations—whenever they seem likely to produce results. There is no doubt whatever that those sitting around the table with him in Paris share his skepticism, even though they are under much greater pressure from their constituents to be hopeful.

Nor can this skepticism be deemed unjustified. We remember how, at its beginnings, NATO was greeted with the Stockholm Peace Resolution, which thousands of West Europeans signed and which was followed, in turn, by the invasion of South Korea. We recall too that the Geneva Summit conference of 1955, for all the dulcit-toned Kremlin preparation, cleared the way for Soviet penetration of the Middle East. We do well also to recall that Prime Minister Bulganin's last round of letters was preceded almost exactly one year ago, by another round brutally threatening many of the same addressees with destruction by Russian missiles.

Mr. Kennan would invite the free nations of Western Europe to arm themselves as the Swiss are armed, with a home guard untainted by nuclear or even "modern" weapons. He would have them believe that their security problem is almost exclusively an internal security problem, and that the Russians would not dare try to occupy and control non-Communist countries on their periphery that were strong enough in their faith to defy Soviet efforts to "pacify" them. "I think I can give personal assurance," he said in his fourth Reith lecture in London on December 5,

> that any country which is in a position to say this to Moscow, in that language of military posture and political behavior which the Russian Communists understand best of all, will have little need of foreign garrisons to assure its immunity from Soviet attack.

It would be interesting to have the comments of Gen. Pal Maleter, the Hungarian freedom fighter currently on trial for his life, upon Kennan's *ex-cathedra* assurance.

The tragedy of the last few weeks is that Messrs. Dulles, Bulganin and Kennan, with some assistance from Chancellor Adenauer, and even from Mr. Lester Pearson, managed, unintentionally, to create the impression that the world is divided, not between freedom and despotism, but between those who love and those who despise the bomb. Mr. Stevenson was right when he said we ought not to *talk* so much about armaments. He was wrong only to the extent that, for a time, he seemed also to think that we ought to *do* less about our military strength. But competition with the Russians in terms of *what* we talk about is the most difficult competition we face. Obviously, the Kremlin enjoys greater freedom to determine whether its voice shall thunder or sing. Our tones have to be mixed. We cannot arm ourselves without talking about it. We cannot compete with the Kremlin in terms of "peace" save under this handicap.

☆

Europe, NATO, the world, and not least the United States, are facing a most difficult time. For nearly two years, at least, there will be a question in the minds of the best informed whether we have not fallen seriously behind the USSR in real strength. The pressure of our allies for concessions, for "negotiations" will be maintained; if the Russians continue successful in this latest peace offensive it will mount. What the Kremlin wants now is a circus in which to fly its dove of peace against a silent backdrop of rocket-nuclear power. When they are ready to talk seriously their tone will be different. They will then agree that the quiet anonymity of diplomatic preliminaries is in order, as they did in the Jessup-Malik talks which preceded settlement of the Berlin blockade. And that time may not come so long as they believe, in Gromyko's words, that "the Soviet Union has

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the ascendancy in the field of modern weapons."

Do we, then, decline to talk? Hardly. We must keep the door open, not only because we want to keep our allies, but because only by keeping the door open can we test Russian oratory against what the Russians are willing to do. What we would like but do not expect is a diplomatic offensive. Why shouldn't we go Khrushchev one better and propose, not the mere de-militarization (à la Austria) of the Germanies, Poland and Czechoslovakia, but the de-militarization, neutralization, and guarantee of *all* the European satellites together with Western Germany. If the Russians really want a *détente* they can have it on these terms. But would this Administration advance such a proposal? Not on your life.

Mr. Sam's Chair

THE DEATH of a quiet Southerner, Rep. Jere Cooper of Tennessee, who had served 13 terms in the House of Representatives, is causing major shifts in power politics within the Democratic Party.

Speaker Sam Rayburn, Democratic leader since 1940, will be 76 years old on January 6. And although Mr. Rayburn still seems to have the toughness of a pine knot, naturally much thought is being given to what will happen in the House when Mr. Rayburn dies or retires.

Jere Cooper was one of those in the running as Mr. Sam's successor. As Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee—which has jurisdiction over all revenue legislation, including taxes, debt limit, tariffs and social security—Cooper occupied the third most powerful spot in the House.

Now this power passes into the hands of a younger Southerner who is probably as able as Cooper was and considerably more ambitious. Wilbur Mills of Arkansas will make full use of his chairmanship to advance himself as a candidate for Speaker.

A Harvard Law School graduate, Mills is far more sophisticated than the usual representative from the rural South. He has made himself known to and respected by business and financial leaders and gets along well with the men in the Eisenhower White House and Treasury.

As a leading candidate to succeed Rayburn, Mills will be walking a tight rope between liberals and conservatives. One big advantage he will have is that as Chairman of Ways and Means, which makes committee assignments in the House, Mills will be in an excellent position to make members indebted to him for choice posts. And most members have some favor to ask of Ways and Means on special tax problems important to their constituents. There is also the opportunity to increase the reputation he has for "economic statesmanship" in putting his ideas of sound fiscal policy ahead of party politics.

Mills' problem is to hold on to his Southern support and win more Northern acceptance. But it is here that his candidacy may fall apart. For Mills signed the "Southern Manifesto" against school integration last year.

Mills probably assumes that the Manifesto will fade as an issue and that he can redeem himself with the Northerners of the party in other ways. But the House will be reminded before a new leader is chosen that the Speaker has a special place in our system of government. Third in the line of succession to the Presidency, the Speaker is a major symbol to his party. For the Democrats to accept for that position one who takes his stand on the Southern Manifesto would seem almost suicidal.

CURTAINS

[Secretary Dulles] said that American-Spanish relations are "close," that Spain makes an "important" contribution to free world defense.—News Dispatch, Dec. 22.

THE freedom-loving leaders of the West
Whose hate for despots cannot be expressed,
With vigilance unsleeping
Through murky curtains peeping,
Keep watch wherever freedom is suppressed.

Behind the Iron Curtain it aspires,
Behind the Bamboo Curtain it retires,
Behind the Cocoa Curtain
Its status is uncertain,
But behind the Onion Curtain it expires.

All civil rights and liberties they bar
In the whole Iberian Peninsula,
Which neither chose, nor voted
For bosses self-promoted,
Dictator Franco, tyrant Salazar.

Indignant that the Russian and Chinese
Must groan beneath tyrannical decrees,
The Free World finds it harder
To speak with equal ardour
For Spaniards and downtrodden Portuguese.

Nor do the great Democracies explain
Why Slavs and Asians should their freedom gain
By counter-revolution
And a liberal Constitution,
But not the Proles of Portugal and Spain.

Where Communists have put out freedom's light,
With righteous wrath and massive moral might,
They bare to world spectators
The crimes of all dictators
(Excepting the dictators of the Right.)

Since those Bamboo and Iron Curtains fell,
One half mankind in misery must dwell—
Their shocking situation
Demands prompt liberation,
But behind the Onion Curtain—all is well.

SAGITTARIUS

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Okinawan Showcase

AMERICAN generals do not normally remove elected mayors from office. Yet this is what has happened in effect in Okinawa, described by some Congressmen and journalists as a model of "democratic" military occupation. Like most showcases, Okinawa is less impressive when viewed from the rear. The acts of its elected legislature are not only subject to the absolute veto of the American High Commissioner, Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, but may be set aside or amended at will by the High Commissioner's ordinances. Okinawan courts have jurisdiction over native Okinawans only when US authorities do not choose to exercise their own jurisdiction, and due process of law has not prevented the US armed forces from acquiring nearly 20 percent of Okinawa's arable land, mostly through compulsory requisition (*NR*, June 10, 1957). It does not surprise us, therefore, that the Okinawans, whose economic, cultural and educational capital is still Tokyo, wish to return to their pre-1945 status as a Japanese prefecture.

Because he strongly voiced this sentiment and the dissatisfaction with US land acquisition, leftist Kamejiro Senaga was elected mayor of the capital city of Naha in December, 1956. But US military authorities, who allege he is a Communist, immediately set out to cripple Senaga's administration. The US-controlled Bank of the Ryukyus stopped giving loans for public works and refused to accept the city's deposits. Other banks followed suit. By June pressures on city assemblymen were so strong that they voted no-confidence in Senaga, thus necessitating new assembly elections. Much to the dismay of American officials, Senaga's supporters, who had held six seats in the old assembly, then doubled their strength in the August contest by waging an anti-American campaign. Thus they became numerous enough to prevent, by their absence, the two-thirds quorum required for the second no-confidence vote which had been planned to force the mayor's resignation.

By November 24, General Moore, unable to defeat his opponent under the existing rules of the game, exercised his unlimited powers to change the rules. He issued an ordinance which reduced quorum requirements in city assemblies to a simple majority. The next day no-confidence was voted and a new mayoralty election scheduled for January 12. But Senaga won't be running next time. For another ordinance disqualified all persons convicted of a felony from holding public office, and a US court convicted Senaga in 1954 of concealing an alleged Communist under order of deportation.

All this has added to anti-American feeling in Japan. The Japanese Socialist Party has requested the government to protest to Washington. In the 1956 Diet elections the Socialists made substantial gains partly by exploiting the inequity of US land acquisition procedures in Okinawa. Subsequently, President Eisenhower's rejection in June of Premier Kishi's request for administration of Okinawa by Japan reinforced Socialist determination to make the Okinawan issue "one keystone" of their drive to unseat the present conservative government in Tokyo.

Lead Kindly Luce

WE WERE THINKING about all the editorials and sermons that will be written next week saying how Sputnik was really *good* for us, and how America is still America, and it so depressed us that we went to our shelf of Reassuring Reading and took down Henry R. Luce's essay of 1941 on "The American Century." We wish to share its message of hope and inspiration with younger readers, to whom it may not be familiar:

> America is already the intellectual, scientific and artistic capital of the world.
>
> * * *
>
> Most important of all, we have that indefinable, unmistakable sign of leadership: prestige. And unlike the prestige of Rome or Genghis Khan or 19th Century England, American prestige throughout the world is faith in the good intentions as well as in the ultimate intelligence and ultimate strength of the whole American people.
>
> * * *
>
> We must undertake now to be the Good Samaritan of the entire world. . . . For every dollar we spend on armaments, we should spend at least a dime in a gigantic effort to feed the world—and all the world should know that we have dedicated ourselves to this task.
>
> * * *
>
> The vision of America as the dynamic leader of world trade has within it the possibilities of such enormous human progress as to stagger the imagination. . . . For example, we think of Asia as being worth only a few hundred millions a year to us. Actually, in the decades to come Asia will be worth to us exactly zero—or else it will be worth to us four, five, ten billions of dollars a year.
>
> * * *
>
> It now becomes our time to be the powerhouse from which the ideas spread throughout the world and do their mysterious work of lifting the life of mankind from the level of the beasts and to what the Psalmist called a little lower than the angels.
>
> * * *
>
> Other nations can survive simply because they have endured so long—sometimes with more and sometimes with less significance. But this nation, conceived in adventure and dedicated to the progress of man—this nation cannot truly endure unless there courses strongly through its veins from Maine to California the blood of purpose and enterprise and high resolve.

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Indonesia, the Dutch and US Policy

by BENJAMIN HIGGINS

On the eve of the NATO conference in Paris, the Dutch Government made a request for NATO "solidarity" in dealing with the new outbreak of conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Indonesia replied with an appeal to 28 Asian-African countries for support in the dispute. As in Indo-China and Indonesia at the close of World War II, and recently in Algeria, the US is caught in a struggle between a European ally and an Asian-African nationalist movement.

The immediate issue is the treatment of Dutch property and nationals in Indonesia. Behind this issue lies the rivalry of Indonesia and the Netherlands for sovereignty in Dutch New Guinea (or West Irian, as the Indonesians call it). In the United Nations, the United States abstained from voting on the Indonesian proposal for reopening negotiations over West Irian. The real issues, however, are both more deep-seated and broader in their implications. On these basic issues abstention is not a course that is really open to the United States.

The legal basis of Indonesia's claim to West Irian is Article II of the Round Table Agreements of November, 1949. Article I of these Agreements transferred sovereignty over the rest of the Netherlands East Indies to the new Republic of Indonesia. Article II specifically reserved the question of New Guinea, but stipulated that "the political status of New Guinea be determined through [further] negotiations" within one year. Indonesian governments have interpreted this Article as a promise that transfer of sovereignty over New Guinea would follow shortly. The moral claim of Indonesia rests partly on this same basis and partly on now widespread antagonism to continuing colonialism anywhere in Asia or Africa.

The Dutch legal claim rests on insistence that no transfer of sovereignty over New Guinea was implied in the Round Table Agreements. Also the Dutch have been there for a long time and possession is nine points of the law. The Dutch argument that the Papuans are racially and linguistically distinct from the rest of the Indonesians is not very convincing, when one considers how many races and languages have been combined in the present Indonesia. The moral claim of the Dutch is that they can do more for the Papuans than Indonesia can—an argument in itself irrefutable. The only question is whether the Dutch can be expected to do more for the Papuans than they did for the Indonesians during three centuries of rule. The Indonesians argue that the major Dutch development project in New Guinea was a concentration camp for imprisonment of Indonesian nationalists.

If one thinks mainly in terms of the fate of the one million Papuans in New Guinea, the only strong moral case is one for United Nations trusteeship, combined with a technical and capital assistance program to raise levels of productivity and literacy, and to provide a cadre of educated leaders to administer the country if later, in a free vote, the Papuans should choose independence from both Indonesia and Holland.

The outcome of the internal struggle for power in Indonesia, which is reflected in the campaign against the Dutch and the outcry for West Irian, is of vital importance for the United States. The last year—ever since Sukarno returned from his visit to Russia, Yugoslavia and China an advocate of "guided democracy" — has brought sharpened political polarization in Indonesia. On one side are President Sukarno, the left-wing faction of the Nationalist Party, and the Communists. It is this group that has been most vociferous about West Irian, and which was responsible for the initial seizure of Dutch properties by the trade unions. On the other side are Prime Minister Djuanda and most of his Cabinet, ex-Vice President Hatta (who resigned in protest against Sukarno's "conception" of guided democracy), the two big Moslem parties, and nearly all—perhaps all—of the Army command. This group, together with right-wing Nationalists, have constituted the government ever since the transfer of sovereignty, with the exception of the two Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinets.

Under the provisional constitution Sukarno is President in the French sense, not in the American sense. He is a signer of bills, a layer of cornerstones, and an appointer of formateurs when governments fall. But Sukarno has never been content with this position, and his popularity among the people has been such that he has not had to content himself *de facto* with the powers accorded to him *de jure*. His "conception" of guided democracy cost him the support of virtually everyone but the extreme nationalists and Communists. Meanwhile, the Communists, concentrated on the island of Java, have grown from about one-fifth of the electorate at the time of the elections in November, 1955, to perhaps one-third of the electorate today. In terms of sheer numbers, Sukarno probably still

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has the support of half the people. He thinks he is using the Communists to maintain his political influence, and they find him a convenient figurehead and mouthpiece.

The Djuanda-Hatta-Army-Moslem group, who with right-wing Nationalists constitute the effective government, are on the whole moderate, pro-Western, and more concerned with getting on with the job of economic stabilization and development than with moves against the Dutch or acquisition of West Irian. But with sentiment so evenly divided, they cannot ignore the nationalist aspirations of the other group. Nationalist cries—"Give Us Our West Irian!" and "Out With The Dutch!"—have a direct appeal to the people. To say, on the other hand, "let us be patient, we need Dutch capital and expertise," or "let us clean our own house and develop what we have before pressing West Irian," can hardly hope to match this appeal. Thus when Sukarno, losing power in terms of the political party spectrum and ultimate physical strength, if not in terms of sheer numbers, beats the big drums about Irian and the Dutch, the pro-Western moderates who give higher priority to economic development are in a difficult position. Many Indonesians believe that the failure of *Merdeka*—"Freedom"—to bring prosperity can be traced to the continued control of Indonesian enterprises by the Dutch and other foreigners. Sukarno and his followers play upon these beliefs to divert attention from the real problems of stabilization and development. Arguments for effective measures to meet these problems are much more difficult to make persuasive to millions of illiterate people. Indeed, the only factors which have kept Indonesia from going Communist already are the strength of the Moslem religion and the unusually intellectual, legalistic, and democratic character of the Army command.

In this context, American support for the Dutch means American aid to the Communist cause in Indonesia. It can only give substance to the Communist argument—which many Indonesians are predisposed to believe anyhow—that the Western countries gang together to protect their imperialist interests. It is known in Indonesia that American companies own the majority interest in the New Guinea oil fields, and it is all too easy to convince Indonesians that the failure of the United States to support the Indonesian claim reflects the influence of Big Business on the American Government.

If on the other hand New Guinea becomes part of Indonesia—even if it becomes a United Nations trusteeship—Sukarno, together with the Communists and extreme Nationalists, will be deprived of one of his trump cards in bidding for power in Indonesia. If Dutch properties are formally nationalized and compensation paid, as seems likely, the left wing will no longer be able to blame economic problems on Dutch exploitation.

How serious would it be for the United States if Indonesia went Communist? The direct economic impact would be small. There can be no doubt that from an economic point of view the United States is much more important to Indonesia than Indonesia is to the United States. Recently the United States has become the major trading partner of Indonesia (distributing transit trade with Singapore among countries of ultimate destination). Since independence American investment in Indonesia has increased substantially while Dutch investment—and probably British as well—has declined. On the other hand, Indonesian rubber, petroleum, tin, bauxite, and copra, while not of direct strategic importance to the United States, are by no means insignificant to our SEATO and NATO partners. And Indonesian exports could be a very useful addition to the resources of the Communist bloc.

The fact is that despite the numerical strength of the Communists and extreme Nationalists, Indonesia thus far has been "neutral in favor of the West and neutral against the Communists" in her economic relationships. Her trade, foreign borrowing, and foreign aid, has involved the West, not the Communist countries. The $100 million loan from Russia, offered to Sukarno during his visit, has only recently been approved by the Cabinet and has not yet passed through the Parliament. When it does, it will still take time to translate it into specific projects. This treatment of the Russian loan offer reflects the wide and deep suspicion of Russian motives in Indonesia, and follows the same pattern as the trade agreement with China—lip service to neutralism is paid by making a formal agreement, but the preference for the West is shown in the failure to implement it. From an economic point of view, then, Indonesia's going Communist would bring a complete reversal of effective policy.

In sum US policy must be directed toward doing everything possible to keep Indonesia "neutral in favor of us." The odds are still with us, despite the growth in strength of the Communist Party. A minimum requirement of such a policy, where colonial powers have no irrefutable legal and moral claim, is to avoid siding with them on colonial issues. The Dutch claims to West Irian have no such legal or moral superiority. Abstention will not have the desired effect; both Dutch and Indonesians feel in this instance that "those who are not with us are against us." This attitude may seem irrational for a neutralist power, but it must be accepted as a fact of life and considered in framing policy. At the very least, the United States—and Canada and Australia—should shift to insistence on immediate transfer of sovereignty over Dutch New Guinea to a United Nations Trusteeship, pending self-determination by the people of New Guinea at the earliest feasible date. Considering the problem they face in stabilizing and developing their present area, there is good reason to hope that the Indonesians would accept this temporary solution to the dispute, if given equal freedom with the Dutch to present their case to the people of New Guinea.

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1958 on the Farm— The Problem of Plenty

ON DECEMBER 9, *the Committee for Economic Development, an organization of forward-looking businessmen, released the results of its lengthy study of major farm problems. The CED recommended moving millions more farmers out of agriculture and progressively lowering present price supports until agriculture is returned to a free market.*

The New Republic *asked Dr. John D. Black, retired professor of economics at Harvard University and one of the world's leading students of agricultural economics, to evaluate the CED plan. His comments follow:*

THE OVER-RIDING economic problem of American agriculture is the low income of 2.7 million of its farmers, largely but by no means altogether in the South, defined in the Committee on Economic Development statement as having sales of farm products of less than $2,500 a year. These 2.7 million sell only 9 percent of the nation's farm products.

The over-riding political problem is that of the remaining 2 million who produce the 91 percent. It is the farmers of this group and their spokesmen in Congress who are demanding higher support prices. Yet even at present prices, without rigorous production controls, they produce more and more. Winter wheat seedings this year, for example, were close to the pre-soil bank level. The 1958 wheat crop, therefore, is expected to be up by 28 percent over the 1957 crop. The yield per acre will be up too—by two bushels more per acre than this year.

Why do they increase planting at this rate? Because they make more money by producing more even at present prices. The great surge in the use of more power and machinery, more commercial fertilizers and other new technology that started during the last war and is still continuing. Farm output is 30 percent higher now than in 1940. Why do they ask for higher prices? Because they got used to them in the War and Marshall Plan years. Why should their prices be allowed to drop to 82 percent of parity, they ask, when urban wages are rising each year?

The CED's proposal for the low-income farmers is right to the point. It is, in effect, to buy or rent their farms and help them move into other occupations. It assumes, of course, that we shall continue to have what is really over-full employment off the farms, labor scarcity in many spots and rising wages. The most important things to say about this proposal are that it will not reduce the total amount of products for sale very much and it must be very carefully administered. It could easily leave large numbers of these farm families worse off than they are now. After all, they do have a house to live in, and the larger part of the food and fuel they need. And in actual fact many of the 2.7 million classified as low-income farmers are not making out as poorly as the statistics suggest. More than half of the group are part-time or residential farmers, who by definition earn more income off the farm than on, and who often share in the earnings other members of the family bring in from outside. There is no record of the real income of the other half of the 2.7 million who are listed by the census as regular commercial farmers, for they may work as many as 99 days a year off the farm and earn up to half their income on the outside without that being counted in their farm income. Frequently there is still more income brought in by other members of the family with jobs in town. These people in many cases, don't want to and don't need to move off the farm.

Also it must be kept in mind that a large fraction of the 2.7 million farmers are too old to shift to a new occupation, or too easy-going, to use mild language, to be ready to make such a drastic change.

And surely such an undertaking should not be pushed too hard. The farm population has been declining at an average rate of 800,000 a year since 1949. At this rate, it will be down to 5 percent of the national total before 1975.

IT SHOULD be obvious from what has already been stated that the CED's proposal for gradual reduction of price supports to a level that will not underwrite excess output is entirely reasonable. Whether a voting majority of the 2 million better-income farmers would vote for lowering price supports in preference to rigorous marketing quotas for all crops—15 of them, plus probably all meats and dairy and poultry products, according to a plan that will be put up to Congress—is highly uncertain. Whether the members of Congress will vote to lower price supports rather than impose strict marketing quotas is another question. A best guess is that they will not, even though the farmers might. Most of the Congressmen will figure that they will lose more votes by going against those who want high price supports than by voting the other way.

Finally, if the nation really wants to take land out of crop production as a way of reducing output, we will have to rent or buy, not just the land being farmed by the low-income families producing 9 percent of the output, as the CED program implies, but some of the farms that are producing the 91 percent of the output as well.

JOHN D. BLACK

Belmont, Mass.

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The Gas Lobby at Work

Crossing Palms and Scratching Backs

IT IS ALMOST two years since that dramatic morning of February 3, 1956, when Sen. Francis Case (R, S.D.) exposed a crude attempt by the natural gas lobby to bribe him with $2,500 for a favorable vote on a bill to loosen federal regulation of their industry. Case's sensational revelations led to a reluctant Presidential veto of the bill on grounds of "arrogant lobbying."

Now, as the lobby warms up for a fresh assault on Congress, evidence that the Case story was not unique has come to light in the form of a totally ignored transcript of hearings before the Securities and Exchange Commission. This interesting document revolves around one William A. Dougherty. Dougherty is one of the architects of the new Harris bill which, if passed, would cost the gas-consuming public an estimated extra $700 million a year. He is also general counsel and vice president of the Mississippi River Fuel Corp.; director and vice president of the Colorado Interstate Gas Co.; and general counsel and director of the Consolidated Natural Gas Co., a giant holding company.

Last October 18, without fanfare, the SEC disbarred Dougherty from the further practice of law before it, as the penalty for his giving the Commission "false and misleading testimony" during an investigation growing out of the Orville Hodge scandal. [Hodge, who as a state auditor of Illinois, misappropriated more than $1 million, is now in the penitentiary at Joliet, Ill.] Investigators found evidence of a $5,000 payment to Hodge from Dougherty, and the SEC then began to probe the possibility that a utility holding company [represented by Dougherty] had violated the law by making a political contribution to Hodge.

* * *

On January 18, 1957, Dougherty was called in by the SEC to tell what he knew about the transaction. He testified: "I got this telephone call from a personal friend in Illinois saying he was badly in need of $5,000." Dougherty went on to say that the friend "met me at the airport [in St. Louis], I endorsed it and turned it over to him."

Q: Has he ever been a legislator?
Dougherty: No. [Hodge had been].
Q: Or a public official in any capacity?
A: No, sir. No, sir . . . [Hodge was.]
Q: And were you repaid?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Within a reasonable period of time?
A: Well, let's see. I should say it was over a little better than a year. Sometime last spring—I received back the full amount. That is, it wasn't at one time. It was over a period of time. I have been reimbursed.

During this first hearing Dougherty steadfastly refused to name the recipient of the "loan." It was "a friend" who, he thought, had gambling debts, and whom he did not wish to embarrass.

* * *

The next interrogation occurred on March 5. At this session Dougherty invoked the Fifth Amendment to avoid naming Hodge. He was then compelled to testify under the Immunity Law:

Dougherty: The check in question was put by me in an envelope . . . it was taken by me to the Missouri Athletic Club, and left there with the man in charge of the office, and on the envelope was the name of Orville Hodge . . .
Q: What persuaded you, Mr. Dougherty, to make the payment to Mr. Hodge?
A: . . . I had heard he had a good chance of maybe not the next Governor but eventually.
Q: That was some motivation in your willingness to provide him with $5,000 at that time?
A: It certainly was . . . I thought if I could do him the favor which he had asked me, that I would be in much better position to get his help . . .

The discussion then turned to Illinois state legislation which would have brought Mr. Dougherty's Mississippi River Fuel Corp. under the jurisdiction of the Illinois Commerce Commission. "Neither the company, nor I wanted that particular legislation passed . . . I thought it would be helpful if I could go to Mr. Hodge and say 'Whom should I see here about working on this bill?' "

Q: Of course, actually what you were trying to do, Mr. Dougherty, was to develop a friend for Mississippi River Fuel Corp., weren't you?
A: Well, let me put it this way: I presume that if I were not a lawyer for Mississippi River Fuel, I wouldn't have done that. . . .

Now begins the embarrassing series of contradictions.

Q: As I recall your testimony . . . you told me that you gave the check to your friend at the airport in St. Louis. Now if that is a fact, you are now correcting your testimony?
A: That is right. . . .
Q: Did he ever pay back the loan?
A: I never got it paid back in cash. I got it paid back in experience, gentlemen, I can tell you that.
Q: Mr. Dougherty, didn't you testify to me on January 18 that it had been paid back to you in full, maybe not in the form of cash, but you certainly gave me the impression, and meant to give me the impression, didn't you, sir, that you received full restitution?
A: I didn't mean to give you any particular impres-

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sion . . . I don't think I said in cash. I said I had been paid or compensated, something like that.

Q: Did Mr. Hodge do anything to prevent passage of the bill which your company was opposing?

A: . . . I don't know, but he did nothing at my request, sir. . . .

Q: You didn't have to request him to do anything. He is a grown up man. He knows for $5,000 he is expected to do something, isn't he? . . . We have reason to believe the only reason the bill didn't pass is because of Mr. Hodge. . . .

A: Maybe Hodge had something to do with it, maybe he didn't, I don't know. But if he did, all right.

Dougherty: The only reason I entertained the thought of making $5,000 available is because I felt circumstances would arise when it might help me in my work for Mississippi to represent them in the instances that I mentioned and get benefits for them, or get help through him or by him from other people. . . .

Q: Do you think, on the basis of your business experience, that it is a widespread practice to extend favors to public officials in order to garner their good will so that they may be availed of at future times to give an assisting hand with lobbying?

A: Well, I think, very frankly . . . as I look around and see what goes on, I don't know what you mean by favors, but there are a lot of things done for people who are prominent in public life. . . . The way the citizen and representative of business has to keep in touch with what is going on is you have got to know the people . . . the only way you can discuss legislative matters is to see people who will listen to you, and those that you know listen to you a lot better than those you don't know.

Dougherty was recalled once more. On July 9, 1957, he testified again. He admitted having been "evasive," but it wasn't his fault, he contended, if his "evasive answers . . . were interpreted . . . contrary to the fact." What did it all add up to? Not much, according to Dougherty:

> To me it is no different than making a contribution to a political candidate who thinks as the contributor thinks. He doesn't necessarily do what you ask him to do but at least you get a friendly hearing which is most important in these matters and which is constantly done in Washington in Congressional matters.
>
> * * *
>
> And finally: I really was irritated that a lot of this stuff would be gone into . . . with a measly little $5,000 compared with more than a million dollars that Mr. Hodge had taken out of the state treasury, it seemed to me it was making a mountain out of a molehill.

Dr. Dreistein Writes the White House

by J. LINCOLN PAINE

A letter sent by Albert Einstein to President Roosevelt on August 3, 1939, launched the nuclear age by bringing to the President's attention the phenomenon and promise of atomic energy. In this not-so-gentle spoof of bureaucratic language and practice, a somewhat similar letter gets different treatment. The author, a scientist intimately familiar with the administrative labyrinth that faces a technical project in the Government, writes under a pen name. Prof. Dreistein is, of course, an entirely fictional character.

Advanced Research Institute,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
2 August 1961.

The President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
Esteemed Sir:

Some recent work by my colleague, Prof. Hauck of Pretoria, has been communicated to me in manuscript. His findings lead me to believe that scientists may be able to counteract the forces of gravity in the near future. Undoubtedly, if Hauck's new discoveries are further developed and applied, a vast new area of space exploration and missile development will open.

The situation which has arisen seems to call for watchfulness and, if necessary, quick action on the part of the Administration. My colleagues here have urged me to bring this obviously significant development to the attention of the appropriate Government authorities. I believe, therefore, that it is my duty to bring to your attention some of the scientific facts which are attached in a separate memorandum.

Of course, my colleagues and I offer our full services towards the further development of this discovery.

Very truly yours,
EGBERT DREISTEIN

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Special Assistant
to the President.
16 August 1961.

To: The Secretary of Defense

Attached is copy of letter from Prof. Egbert Dreistein.

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Draft reply for my signature. Be polite. Incidentally, is there anything to this?

GRANT QUINCEY

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 2 September 1961.
Ref.: CPT-201/1.

To: Col. T. Lee, OPS
From: The Secretary

Prepare reply to attachment. Is the Institute under contract to the DOD? Quote me their budget figures for the last three fiscal years.

Official Use Only

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 29 June 1962.
Ref.: CPT-201/179.

To: The Secretary
From: Col. T. Lee, OPS

The matter referred to in your memorandum CPT-201/1 of 2 September 1961 has been referred to an Inter-Service Ad Hoc Committee of staff-rank representatives. The committee concurred that there was no consensus on the problem.

Individual views were as follows:

1. The Army feels that ordinary gravity is not fully understood yet and sees little purpose in extending studies into the field of anti-gravity.
2. The Air Force has been conducting small-scale research on anti-gravity at the TOP SECRET level. However, since it is impossible to extend the concept to fit existing weapons systems, a low priority has been assigned.
3. The Navy has recommended a high priority to anti-anti-gravity investigations under the code name of PLOP.

There is no record in DOD files of a facility clearance for the Advanced Research Institute. Prof. Dreistein has never applied for a "Q" clearance. Given the sensitive nature of the anti-gravity question and the extenuating circumstances, the attached draft reply to Prof. Dreistein has been made as clear as classification permits.

The committee reached agreement on a single point: Prof. Dreistein should not be encouraged. A permanent subcommittee has been set up to provide similar assistance in expediting the handling of any future suggestions from the scientific community.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary
2 July 1962.

To: Special Assistant to the President

In reference to your request of 16 August 1961; attached is draft reply to Prof. Egbert Dreistein.

The receipt of Prof. Dreistein's letter has stimulated re-examination of the status of anti-gravity research in the Department of Defense. Estimated future budgetary allocations for that type of research do not warrant continuation of the projects which have been under way. Accordingly, I have issued an order that they be curtailed.

FRANK WATT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Special Assistant
to the President.
5 July 1962.

Prof. Egbert Dreistein,
The Advanced Research Institute,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Dear Prof. Dreistein:

The President has directed me to reply to your letter of 2 August 1961. We thank you for your interest and assure you that the matter has been investigated by appropriate Government agencies.

Your patriotic interest is very much appreciated and the President is always interested in receiving stimulating ideas of that nature.

Yours very truly

GRANT QUINCEY

MOSCOW, Aug. 5 (1964).—A Soviet spokesman announced today that a manned space station has been established as a satellite around Mars and is now observing landing conditions on that planet.

The achievement was credited to the revolutionary discoveries of Prof. Otto Hauck, formerly of South Africa and now in the Soviet Union. He has been awarded three Lenin prizes for his work. . . .

THE WHITE HOUSE

6 August 1964.

Prof. Egbert Dreistein,
The Advanced Research Institute,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Dear Prof. Dreistein:

My advisers report to me that you have been interested in the subject of anti-gravity research. Because of the grave circumstances in which our Government finds itself as a result of the announcement from Moscow yesterday, I am asking you to lead a new high priority project in that direction.

If you will come to Washington the early part of next week, a briefing will be arranged by representatives of the military services and the Central Intelligence Agency who will be able to give you a little of the historical development of Prof. Hauck's work.

I, as President, personally hope that you and your colleagues will rise to the challenge of this new emergency.

Yours very truly,

HORATIO CALVIN

[*from the Wash., D. C.*, Sunday Star, *Nov. 17, 1957.*]

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Have the "Kennan Plans" Come Too Late?

Bonn

NO RECENT event—probably not even the launching of the two Soviet Sputniks or the failure of the American space-rocket—has had greater impact on thinking Germans than the statements made by America's former Ambassador to Moscow, George Kennan, in his Reith lectures over the BBC. This may sound a startling generalization. But Germans, like other Europeans, grew quickly used to the idea of earth satellites, once the first shock of surprise caused by the first Sputnik wore off. After a round of acid comments they practically forgot about the failure of the American satellite, called variously the "Spaet-nik" or "Kaput-nik." But Mr. Kennan's Reith lectures will not be quickly forgotten, and there has already been time to judge the weight of their impact.

The three suggestions made by Mr. Kennan which have most bearing on the German problem were that a reunified Germany should be excluded, prior to reunification, from any major military alliance, that some kind of "zone of limited armaments" could be created in Central Europe, and that at least the whole of Germany—and possibly a wider area—could be "nuclear-neutralized," in fact cleared of all nuclear weapons. The "Kennan Plans" were followed up by the Polish proposal for the extension of the Central European zone of limited armaments, and by the equally loud if less lucid demand of the Foreign Minister in the British Labour Party's "shadow cabinet," Aneurin Bevan, for a new political initiative to break the diplomatic deadlock over Germany.

Within a week of Mr. Kennan's two first and most relevant Reith lectures the following reactions occurred in Western Germany:

The Social Democratic Party came out in full and unequivocal support of all three Kennan Plans. On December 11 the Social Democratic leaders were closeted for long hours with Mr. Bevan, and on December 13 they announced their intention of instituting a new disarmament drive through the medium of the Socialist International, whose disarmament committee will meet next month.

The Free Democrats welcomed the initiative shown by Mr. Kennan and especially his suggestion that a zone of limited armaments should be created in Central Europe. They pointed out that Britain's last Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, suggested much the same thing two years ago but never followed up his first tentative proposals. And, for that matter, the "Eden Plan" was itself very similar to two plans put forward four years ago by the foreign affairs expert of the FDP, Dr. Karl Pfleiderer, who died this past fall while at his post of Ambassador in Belgrade.

The Trade Unions, in a more reserved way, supported the Kennan Plans. Their weekly paper, *Welt der Arbeit*, published a cartoon showing the Federal Foreign Minister, Heinrich von Brentano, lying in bed and clutching frantically to an eiderdown marked "status quo." Plucking it off him were a number of hands, belonging to "Kennan," "Bevan," "Norway," "Denmark" and the *London Times* newspaper. Another Trade Union publication asked if there were any people left in Germany who seriously believed in the "Adenauer Plan" of "negotiating from a position of strength" and forcing concessions out of the Soviet Union.

Finally, the daily paper *Die Welt* published a resounding leading article from the pen of its editor, Hans Zehrer. In his view Soviet feelers—in the shape of the Bulganin letters sent to the heads of the Western states last week—had to be taken seriously. They might, Herr Zehrer thought, constitute the last chance of coming to real grips with the German problem. *Die Welt* backed up this leading article with a cartoon of Secretary Dulles, depicted as an old-fashioned phonograph braying everlastingly "Too unrealistic . . . too unrealistic."

Two other events gave the Kennan Plans an added importance which was, as it happened, incidental. The Goettingen group of nuclear scientists repeated on December 4 the protest which they had made earlier in the year against the use of nuclear weapons by the West German armed forces or the storing of them on German soil. And a public opinion survey carried out by the EMNID institute in Bielefeld showed that 73 percent of those asked were against the use of nuclear weapons by the German Army, and 74 percent were against the establishment of ballistic missile bases on German soil.

There have been similar movements in favor of a new foreign policy in the past. In the 1953 Federal Elections two openly neutralist parties felt strong enough to run, one of them led by Gustav Heinemann, Federal Minister of the Interior in Adenauer's first Cabinet, and the other by Josef Wirth who negotiated the Treaty of Rappallo 35 years ago as Reichs Chancellor. In 1954 the Social Democrats launched their St. Paul's Church campaign against German rearmament in Frankfurt. A year ago popular feeling that too little had been done to obtain German reunification was so strong that the Social Democrats announced their intention of fighting this year's Federal Election on a neutralization ticket. Thus the Kennan Plans need not be regarded as revolutionary in any sense. Ten

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years ago, before the "Eden plan," before both of the "Pfleiderer Plans," there was a neutralist group in Western Germany led by the Wuerzburg Professor Ulrich Noack, which advocated much the same things as Mr. Kennan. Only 10 years ago the nuclear issue did not furnish so obvious or urgent a pretext.

The feelings of the great mass of the 52 million West Germans toward the Kennan Plans are conditioned primarily by their desire for security. But will that desire for security be satisfied if American troops are withdrawn from Germany (and possibly from the whole of Europe as a result)? For three reasons the answer is *No.* The three reasons are the three nightmares which currently trouble West Germans—that withdrawal from the European Continent will lead to the crystallization of a self-contained Anglo-American entente with a diminishing interest in continental affairs; that the old bogey of American isolationism will be re-born; or that the US and the Soviet Union may "do the big deal" at Germany's expense, leaving Germany permanently divided.

Another factor, and one which makes the Kennan Plans less appetizing at second sight, is that absolutely no new offer on German reunification has come from the Soviet Union. Marshal Bulganin has indicated the Russian desire for German disarmament, the creation of an "atom-free" zone in Central Europe and the banning of ballistic-missile bases on German soil. Why? Because all these aims assist the primary Soviet aim of keeping Germany divided in order to keep the satellite bloc intact.

A reunified Germany—as many Germans are beginning to realize—could only mean one of two things to the Soviet Union. It could be unfriendly and drift into the Western camp. In that case it would be a physical danger—to the USSR—rather more so because the German claims to the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line have never been dropped or modified by one jot. On the other hand, reunified Germany might be purely friendly and peaceful. But in that case, how could the "German threat" be used to hold the satellite bloc together? Its disintegration would be a matter of time, and Poland would be the first to drop out of it.

This, presumably, is the Russian reasoning which has led to the attachment by the Soviets of impossible conditions to German reunification—East-West all-German talks, the formation of a half-Communist "constituent assembly," the maintenance of both German regimes in a Germanic Confederation, the "democratizing" of Western Germany by the nationalization of industry and splitting up of agricultural holdings.

The Kennan Plans will not, at least, lapse into the background of the public consciousness with the same furtive rapidity as the Eden and Pfleiderer Plans. This is partly because Mr. Kennan has spoken with a more authoritative voice, and partly because the controversy over nuclear weapons and their use will keep his thoughts in the public mind. But in the long run the Kennan Plans may share the fate of their spiritual forerunners. This is because the Soviet rulers, while ready to make progress over limited disarmament in Central Europe, are not ready to settle its political problems. Limited disarmament is actually to be used as a means to a political end—the maintenance of the status quo from which the Russians have everything to gain. They intend to give up nothing. And this may be the first fruit of the two Sputniks. In that event the Kennan Plans have come too late.

TERENCE PRITTIE

NATO and Nuclear Weapons

by DEAN ACHESON

IN THE RECENT past both Americans and Europeans have felt the allure of a policy which would virtually dispense with local European defense and rely upon the United States "drawing a line" and announcing that, should the Russians cross it, nuclear retaliation will descend upon them. But a little reflection reveals how untenable this strategy is.

To begin with, it is quite impossible to draw any clear line which would carry conviction of our purpose to the other side. Would the line be geographical? And if so, where would it run? Would the line have to be crossed solely by foreign troops? And if so whose; Russian only, or a satellite's? Must the crossing be in force—if so, in what force? Would the reason for a crossing be a factor—for instance, alleged reprisal, as along the borders of Israel? Would a Soviet inspired coup, arming of dissidents, etc., figure in drawing the line? Experience with the Eisenhower doctrine in the Middle East does not encourage belief in the possibility of "drawing a line."

Then again, the policy requires the United States to bear the whole burden of expense and risk, since the sole

DEAN ACHESON *served as Secretary of State from 1949 to 1953. His article is taken from a new book,* Power and Diplomacy, *to be published on January 13 by the Harvard University Press.*

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instrument of defense would be US nuclear striking power, and the sole enemy target would be the United States. Finally, from the European point of view, the fate of our allies would lie entirely in our decisions without our having given any hostages—in the form of forces in Europe—to cement our interests. The confidence of Europe in our future decisions is not enough to make this possible. It would not be healthy to have it so.

Realism drives us toward the conclusion that the security of Western Europe by means of the American alliance requires the creation in Europe of joint defense forces of sufficient strength so that, to overcome them, the Soviet Union must face the necessity of attacking the United States. This strategy relies—for the time being, at least—upon American nuclear striking power as the ultimate restraint and control upon Soviet action—not our primary reliance in Europe, but our final reliance.

Recently a theory has been put forward which proposes to substitute for "all-out" nuclear striking power as the ultimate sanction, limited nuclear war. Under this theory long-range nuclear retaliatory power is regarded as deterring or meeting only all-out war. The protection of Europe would lie in a limited form of nuclear war conducted by highly mobile, tactically independent units operating, often deep in enemy territory, like naval task forces hunting out opposing units, and preventing enemy occupation of territory. They would not be directed against cities, industry, airfields, or communications, since these would have ceased to be important.[1]

This strategic theory fails because it is based on assumptions of fact which are not true. The weapons with which to fight this war do not exist and are not likely to exist for some time.[2] Second, it ignores the crucial importance of the air battle. If the Soviet Union were contemplating the seizure of Western Europe, and if the intervention of SAC is, by hypothesis, to be ruled out, the first effort would be to knock out NATO air and missile forces. If this could be done, the battlefield might well fall to Soviet control. NATO air and missile forces, if they should survive a surprise attack, would endeavor to remove the similar forces of the other side. If, at that point, the mobile nuclear ground forces of either side remained operable, they would pick up the task of destroying their opponents, together with their lines of supply, bases, etc., in the rear. A considerable part of Europe might well be knocked to pieces by these exchanges. Furthermore, a military establishment capable of these activities would not be cheap in its equipment, nor small in manpower requirements. The need for casualty replacements, alone, would be substantial.[3]

But quite apart from its military impracticality, our allies would see at once that the proposed strategy would consign them to a fate more devastating than would compliance with the demands of the Soviet Union. The merit of this strategy, they would be told, would lie in its avoidance of "all-out" nuclear war, but it would seem to be all-out enough for them though designed to restrain the major participants from battering each other with hydrogen bombs. Our allies might even remind us that there is no more sound doctrine for a leader—particularly one whose leadership depends upon consent—than that he should not appear to seek safety for himself through the hazards which he urges upon those whom he hopes to lead.

So it seems plain enough that the conception of making the Western coalition strong and secure by a strategy of meeting Soviet aggression in Europe with limited nuclear warfare there has as little political validity as military. It is essentially a suggestion that the two great nuclear powers protect their homelands from destruction by agreeing that, if they fight at all, they will fight a nuclear war on European territory.

HENCE we return again to the constantly repeated axiom. The efficacy of the American alliance in strengthening and protecting Europe from Soviet domination requires substantial NATO forces in Europe, including American, capable of performing two functions. The first is to stop any attack meant to probe, or which is set off by accident. The second is to face an aggressor with the necessity of moving in such force that he must contemplate an attack upon the United States, as he must know that the NATO battle, if commenced, will certainly bring SAC, or its equivalent, into Russian skies. To provoke this risk would require a recklessness in Moscow which has not been shown in the past.

The answer to the question whether the NATO defense force requires nuclear armament lies in the answer to a further question: Is nuclear armament, over and beyond SAC, necessary to provide the capabilities just mentioned?

Here again the question is not a theoretical one. Certain facts are highly relevant. Already forces defending Europe can muster nuclear power which the Soviet Union cannot overlook. American air and ground forces in Europe have nuclear weapons. Britain has nuclear weapons. In all probability France will have them in the very near future. Certainly the presence of these nuclear weapons, and the possibility that they may be added to, complicates the calculation of risks for the Russians.

The Soviet leaders understand this perfectly well and have acted accordingly. The suggestion that the defense of Europe might be strengthened through nuclear weap-

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[1] Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, p. 307, *et seq.*

[2] See Paul H. Nitze, "Limited Wars or Massive Retaliation?" *The Reporter*, September 5, 1957, p. 40.

[3] James E. King, "Limited Annihilation?" Part II of his review, *The New Republic*, July 15, 1957, pp. 16, 17.

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ons has brought a barrage of threats to the European countries. The Norwegians, the Danes, and the French have all had them. The Germans have been told that if their country were used as a base for a nuclear attack it would be turned into "one big cemetery," and that whoever sought to obtain nuclear arms would run "the risk of becoming in history the gravedigger of German unity." Mr. Khrushchev added his own touch in his speech in East Berlin. In case of another war, he said, Germany would become the special target of hydrogen and atomic bombs. Britain, France, and the United States, he added, were now within the range of these weapons. "No country no matter how remote is safe." Russian efforts to encourage the belief that neutralism is a tenable policy for Western Europe are a good measure of the problems brought to them by any increase in the military potential of Europe, particularly nuclear potential.

Among these fearful risks and problems of vast complexity, no one can be confident. But humility, even despair, in their presence does not enable us to evade decisions. For to do nothing is in itself to make far-reaching decisions. My own conclusions are that present circumstances require substantial strengthening of American and British nuclear power located in Europe, as well as allied (including American) conventional forces and tactical air power. It would, I believe, be wiser to leave the nuclear power in American and British hands and not hasten the dissemination of nuclear weapons. We have problems enough without advancing the time—which seems to me inevitable—when these weapons will be much more widely available than they are today. The difficulties which this situation will present can be more hopefully faced when we have more of our present problems nearer solution. But it well may be that European confidence in the conduct of the American government has been too much impaired to make the wiser solution possible.

Quite as important, indeed more important, than the strengthening of allied nuclear power in Europe, is the long-range policy under which it is done. It would, I believe, be a disastrous mistake to increase nuclear power in Europe as part of our present policy of increasing our military reliance on nuclear weapons. To do this would perpetuate the danger and horror of living under the sword of Damocles. We should strengthen allied nuclear power in Europe purely as a temporary measure, while pressing vigorously with our allies an escape from reliance upon nuclear weapons. The escape lies in the development of allied conventional forces capable of safeguarding Europe against attack by conventional forces. If this is done with determination, there may be, for the first time, some mutual benefit in a proposal for an East-West reduction of forces.

It is continually assumed that the Soviet Union has a vast superiority in manpower over the NATO countries. This is completely untrue. The population of the Soviet Union is 202 million; of the European NATO countries 261 million. These countries have the manpower and industrial base to provide adequate conventional forces. Their governments do not, at present, have the power to mobilize them. This is not due wholly, or even principally, to paralysis of popular will by war weariness or bewilderment in the face of vast and difficult problems. It flows in part, as in France and Italy, from the weakness of governments, which after a century of inadequacy in structure and tradition, are now asked to carry new and heavy burdens; from real loss of economic strength as in Great Britain; from an apparent dichotomy of purposes, between the need for defense and the craving for unification, as in Germany; from absorption in divisive interests as in Greece. For the present the will of these countries will be strengthened by being directed toward goals attainable as a practical matter in the fairly near future. The stiffening of nuclear defense is such a goal. It is not a sound or safe long-term solution.

There may well be better responses to these immense difficulties than I have suggested. I hope so. They will be found only by facing the problems and energetically and honestly seeking solutions. If we are not willing to do this, let us at least not deceive ourselves. Let us not say that we have plans for dealing with the present world crisis, or deny that one exists.

At present we are obscuring all these problems from ourselves through a busy concentration on matters of secondary importance. For international agreements to limit the testing of nuclear weapons and various aerial and other inspections supposed to prevent surprise nuclear attack are of secondary importance. To stop or suspend the testing of hydrogen bombs needs no agreement with the Russians. Some of the proposals seem dubious, but, however that may be, they are all peripheral to the main problem. Suppose, for instance, a scheme of aerial inspection over agreed areas is set up. I suppose simple prudence would require all parties to keep their strategic bombers and missile launching stations as secret and free from observation (and from surprise attack) as possible. If we have the best inspection system and see activity on the other side which alarms us, what are we going to do? Complain about it and have an investigation and by whom? Or launch an anticipatory attack ourselves? The answer must inevitably be that we can never do more than we have the capacity to do. Our capacity in turn will depend upon our industrial productive power, upon the amount of our production which we are willing to devote to making ourselves and our allies militarily strong and economically expanding, upon the wisdom with which we have devised military forces for the tasks they must perform, and upon our success in keeping our coalition united at the center. These are the crucial matters from which we are distracted at our peril by peripheral contests.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

The Practice of Forbearance

by Charles L. Black, Jr.

FREEDOM will never cease to need defense. It took Walter Berns' new book, *Freedom, Virtue, and the First Amendment*, to wake me up to this. The now subsiding recrudescence of the eternal McCarthyism that is the night side of the American soul seemed insignificant in a way, however disgusting it may have been and however destructive in the short run. These people carry their own refutation on their faces. You can no more treat them as serious antagonists of the idea of freedom than you can look on the delinquent engaged in car theft as a formidable critic of the system of private property.

Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment, by Walter Berns (Louisiana; $4).

Mr. Berns is not of that ilk. His preface disdains connection with "this contemporary political theory of conservatism"; his whole text fixes a gulf between him and McCarthyism; it is plain that extremists of the right are as distasteful to him as extremists of the left. His book is a work of good will, without a trace of that intemperateness and hatred that glares out of pages stating theses similar to his. He would, I judge, be happy and at home in just about the same kind of world as would most of the people he stigmatizes (from his point of view, not theirs — though I should think all will wince at the word *qua* word!) as "libertarians." The same kind of world, that is, with one variation. Freedom, in his world, would no longer have intrinsic value. It would be guarded only insofar as it was judged efficaciously to serve other ends.

This, I take it, is the philosophical bedrock of the book. When such a man assumes such a position, we rub our eyes —in astonishment, but also in the gesture of waking. There is a statue in a harbor; "liberty" is an "inalienable right"; the "blessings of liberty" are, in climactic position, to be "secured"; certain words set long ago to an old tune, and sung (thoughtlessly?) in school, stamped liberty with the Authorship of God, and freedom cast a "holy light." Have we taken too much for granted?

Mr. Berns thinks so. To him, freedom is a mere process, uncharged with value until we know what comes of it. The goal of society is not freedom but justice or virtue. So long as freedom conduces to justice and virtue, freedom is to be protected. When it ceases to do so, it has no worth. This is a gauntlet that must be taken up.

Devotees of freedom have themselves strongly stressed the results, past and anticipated, of its enjoyment, to the almost total neglect of its intrinsic value. It was inevitable that someone would come along and make the use that Mr. Berns has made of the assumption that seems to underly so much of freedom's own apologetic. Indeed, so dangerously close has this point come to implicit concession that Mr. Berns hardly feels the necessity of stating it explicitly. Rather, his subjacent assumption is that some quality of obviousness inheres in his contrast between freedom as a mere process or means and justice (or virtue) as goal or end. He never seems quite clearly to have focussed on the possibility that anyone could think that freedom may *be* justice—that to leave a man free may be *cuique suum tribuere*, to give him his bare due as a man.

OF COURSE, this means-end business, brought in the open, wilts. The according of freedom to men is an action; the readiness to do so is a state of will. These things happen as a result of human choice. You cannot, by saying "process," exorcise the serious issue of their intrinsic moral standing. Everything we know about is a process. To say freedom is a process is merely to say that it is accessible to knowledge and discussion. My line of reasoning here does not establish affirmatively that freedom *has* intrinsic moral value, that to accord freedom to others *is* intrinsically virtuous, or that freedom *is*, in justice, the portion of men. But it warns that there is a real issue on the merits.

I disclaim any private wire to the front office of ethical certitude, and I don't think anybody else has one. We cannot live without attachment to values, yet we are so built and placed as never to be able to know for sure whether our values, or any values, have validity—or even what validity means in this sense. That is our predicament; perhaps it is intended as a test of our faith and courage. At all events, we must go back *da capo:* We cannot live without attachment to values. In this spirit, and not with a pretense of scientific sureness or rigor, I can only state some thoughts that make me willing to act on the belief that freedom, as a thing in itself, is worth our attachment.

FREEDOM has two aspects: being free and letting others be free. From the point of view of the man who is accorded freedom, it is doubtless unnatural to speak of freedom as a virtue; but this unnaturalness seems merely linguistic, since only insofar as a man is free can he be virtuous. I think this is universally true; of course a man not free in some respects can be virtuous in others, but that is only because his jailers haven't done a thorough job. Virtue is possible to him only in those areas in which (through forbearance, neglect, or deficiency of technology) he is left free; to be unfree is not to be able to choose, and the "virtue" of the unfree is the merest turning to the light of a phototropic plant. The unfree man cannot be a just man, for to be just is to choose to be just. Freedom is a component of every virtue.

Most of the time, however, when we talk about freedom, we are talking about the other aspect; most of us don't worry much about whether we want freedom for ourselves, but about whether other people ought to have it. Here the case seems very clear, and involves no unnaturalness in speaking. We have seen that the according of freedom to others (or the insistence, as a citizen, that one's government do this) is an *action*—it is something one does, a species of the

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genus that also contains, for example, abstinence from torturing other people. When we cease to isolate ourselves from the issue by the use of a vacuous label like "process"—when we look at this holding off from interference with the other fellow and try to assess its value as a thing in itself—the immediately striking impression is one of its obvious intimate connection (on closer look merging into identity) with things to which few of us would dream of denying the status of virtues. It is, first of all, a form of respect for other people and for their equal human status with ourselves; this, in turn, is an indispensable condition — psychologically probably a part or aspect—of that respect for oneself which, some have said, is the highest of human virtues and an essential ingredient of all the rest. It is a part of charity; charity with this part subtracted leads straight to the stake where the heretic is lovingly burned for the good of his soul. It is one facet of humility; a man is at the foothills of humility when he can say: "After the best consideration that is in me, I think that fellow is not even arguably right in what he says, and I think his speaking has a bad tendency. But I am only one man, and my consideration is only one consideration. He also is a man, and who am I to tell him what he is to say?" And such an act is an act of faith—faith that the world and mankind will not perish through our practicing forbearance with each other.

Or to take this virtue of according freedom to others and judge it by its opposite: In every case in the history of the world when men have set themselves up in the trade of stopping mouths, is not the vice exhibited a self-naming one? Arrogance, self-righteousness, smug satisfaction with one's own capacity to judge the fitness of other men's speech, conversion of the world into a pool for one's own moral and intellectual narcissism? Yes—but these add up to a simpler word: Pride. And in the shadow, fear.

I would add only that thea ccording of freedom to others seems to me to be an act of justice. Men are made with the capacity of choosing; this, and speech, are the distinguishing marks of man. Even the truism, "to each his own," here comes to life. What is justice, if it is not to accord to every man the right to use, in the fullest possible measure, the faculties that make him a man?

Much more could be said. As of all the virtues, all the faces of justice, there is an inexhaustible poetry of freedom, a prose of illimitably varied cadence. In a full treatment, too, there would have to be a star[illegible]ward qualification; that freedom is justice does not imply that absolute freedom, any more than absolute justice, is attainable in our world—though it does imply that we ought to strive for the most possible freedom, that we ought to scrutinize with great caution excuses proferred for its lessening, and that we ought to be especially vigilant lest our own power-lust and funk be mistaken for the world's need.

My limited purpose here has been to meet briefly, on a theoretical level, the challenge Mr. Berns has thrown out. I think we all need to bring forward and stress the intrinsic worth of freedom as a private and civic virtue and as a part of justice. We need not play down those justifications that appeal to consequences; freedom, for all its failures, can give cards and spades to authoritarianism throughout history. But we need to give full and varied expression to what most of us, I think, have assumed all along: Freedom, no matter how much it may have done for us or may promise to do, is chiefly to be loved for itself alone.

Bentley's Choices

by Henry Popkin

A leading authority on the drama tells me that Eric Bentley is mellowing with age. Perhaps this false report reached Bentley himself; that might account for the abundant recent evidence of non-mellowness. In the past few months, Bentley has (1) outpointed a television interviewer (but, then anyone who asks Bentley if he hero-worships James Dean ought to have his camera impounded); (2) reissued *A Century of Hero Worship* with a preface explaining his earlier tolerance of Stalinism and quoting the most "offensive" passages from the first edition; and (2) recommended in the off-Broadway theatre program that all drama critics shoot themselves. He has also continued to make available those plays which are the bane of Broadway and the delight of college campuses. The plays Bentley has reclaimed from oblivion now fill five paperback volumes and three clothbound volumes. *Guys and Dolls* is a shining incongruity in one of the paperbacks, or perhaps it is intended as a conversation piece: "Why do you think he put it in?" "Well, change. . . ." But, for the others, "bane of Broadway" does not adequately convey the situation; Broadway ignores them. At least seven in the paperback series have been performed off-Broadway, some in different translations; one has already flopped off-Broadway this season.

The Modern Theatre, by Eric Bentley (Anchor, five volumes; $.95 and $1.25). *From the Modern Repertoire* (Indiana, three volumes; $15).

Why do these plays appall the rialto although they charm the campus? Before answering, it might be useful to dismiss a traditional explanation of the abyss dividing the professional theatre from the college theatre. These plays are not especially experimental in technique. In the modern theatre, experiment has usually meant one of the varieties of expressionism. Broadway has assimilated what it can use of expressionist distortion; semi-expressionistic plays like *Death of a Salesman* have succeeded notably. While Broadway has become hospitable to watered-down experiments of this sort, Bentley has preserved his preference (which was plain enough in *The Playwright as Thinker*) for undistorted, relatively objective representation of reality. Accordingly, the full-length plays in the paperbacks are mainly objective in method. The two plays out of Bertolt Brecht's epic theater may look like exceptions, but Bentley quite properly regards epic drama as a realistic genre. Its chief innovation is its requirement that the spectator keeps his aesthetic distance and remain fully aware that the play is a play. That demand should startle a Broadway audience rather less than the wilder leaps that expressionism makes;

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as a matter of fact, as Bentley has somewhere pointed out, Broadway habitually uses epic technique in its musicals. In short, Brecht's plays, like the rest of those in the paperbacks, have what might be called accessible conventions. The only selections which betray an expressionistic bias are a one-act play by Wilder and Sean O'Casey's *Cock-A-Doodle-Dandy,* but O'Casey is thrusting only one expressionistic reference, the supernatural cock, into a superficially realistic setting.

THE DIFFERENCE between these plays and the staple commercial product rests finally upon a special attitude and a special selection of life. The special attitude is intelligent, critical, ironic, and resolutely intolerant of the average, the normal, and the mediocre. These plays do not show us the homey, picturesque vignettes of average life on which Broadway thrives. Broadway's serious drama is rooted in the mixed comedy and tragedy of typical family life; the examples of the moment include *The Rope Dancers* and *The Dark at the Top of the Stairs.* These recent instances may be mixed blessings, but it is precisely this familiar middle ground of universally intelligible subject matter which furnished Ibsen with his moral issues, Strindberg with his polemics, Chekhov with his ironies, and Williams with his sensations. The families in question may be wholesome or vicious; they seldom pray together, and often they do not stay together, but the dramatists require that we recognize ourselves and our neighbors in them. Without committing themselves to homey themes, they set their scene in the dead average of family life.

The comedies and tragedies of Bentley's paperbacks reject the average in different ways. Bentley gives us serious drama at the forbidding height of seriousness, with a few ironic glances downward at those who cannot reach the heights. Giraudoux's *Electra* significantly contrasts the gloriously doomed house of Atreus with the trivial, social-climbing family of an Argive politician. Electra has parricide on her mind, and she refuses to be domesticated by marriage into the politician's family, a family which might be related to those neighborly households inhabiting the stages in Times Square.

But Bentley prefers family comedy to family tragedy and to the alternately weepy and laughy tragicomedies that Broadway gives us. Becque's *Woman of Paris* is typical in its direct attack upon what used to be called the sanctity of the home. A *menage à trois* might be typical in French drama, but this particular *menage* goes one better by occasionally accommodating a fourth member. Gogol's *The Marriage* and Brecht's *Threepenny Opera* are similarly tough-minded as they comically expose the deceits of courtship and marriage. In the Brecht play, the heroine's parents express their just wrath when their daughter proves "immoral enough to marry."

The place of sentiment is taken by deceits, disguises, and exposures. Intrigue is a common ingredient of traditional comedy, but the comic characters of these plays outrun the usual in their full consciousness of their roles. They create plays within plays, with actors playing actors for an audience on the stage, to heighten excitement. This practice always carries with it the idea of exposure—revealing the reality behind the masque—and Bentley's selections do nothing if they do not expose—the real Electra as a spoilsport, the real Judith as a loving woman, thieves as true men and true men as thieves, another thief as a model of bourgeois enterprise, was as hell and patriotism as non-existent (in Brecht's *Mother Courage*).

I suspect that Broadway keeps its distance from these plays because it is startled by all this disguise and exposure, by the thought of all that busy intelligence at work. The busy intelligence takes a holiday in Bentley's volume of American plays (*The Modern Theatre,* Volume IV); the older plays are frankly, plainly sentimental, and are therefore too far over at the other extreme. The current Broadway crop falls into the large area between Clyde Fitch and Bertolt Brecht — hard-minded but not tough-minded, embarrassed by sentimentality but not hostile to it.

The Raying Fog

THE raying fog we walked through wasn't thought,
gathered water and not diamonds dropped
from palms and lemons, the joyful boy in boots
awkwardly whichwayed as a small boy hops,

the haunted wife, the daughter with a scarf,
raying, receding, and my darker self
seemed like figures in a fog of life,
dim human symbols but were only us.

The naked Greek arrangements on a vase,
black on red, toward which dead artists bent,
may move us with a curved significance
though only meant to please and decorate.

An exercise in air was our intent—
we strolled through light and and moisture, silhouettes;
appearances where whether jewels dripped
metaphored the weather of our lives.

Beneath a lace of palm and pepper leaves
more than one family walked that spectral fog,
numberless wet husbands with their wives,
lively sons and daughters and the dog

went through mist as we did and came back
to rooms of objects similarly stopped
in surer shapes than that pearl grey and black
of lost identity—as in the fog of sleep.

HAROLD WITT

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ART

East and West in Chicago

A STUDENT passed slowly from drawing to drawing. The subjects were mostly rather endearing little animals or birds done in smooth, graceful and few flowing lines, sometimes with a wash effect to round out the figure, sometimes not. His teacher came up behind him, pinched his ear and bellowed, "What is Zen?"

"Damned if I know," the student replied, "but these are certainly fine animal drawings."

Morris Graves has a middle-sized show at Chicago's Fairweather-Hardin gallery this month and once again a reasonable reaction is compounded of enchantment with that line and irritation at the Chu Chin Chow approach his work calls forth in his admirers. But even if he sets it up himself, an artist cannot be held responsible for the public legend that grows like barnacles on certain artists' work. Graves' legend is Zen, of which he seems to be a devout adherent. If, as I believe, this doesn't make his work better or more significant, it doesn't either make it worse and any less worthy of our attention. Indeed we should all be grateful for Graves' Zen; without it, the odds would be most high against as fine a draughtsman as he is being allowed in the center ring the way the center ring is run these days.

In the religious mania that's been sweeping the country for several years, the artists, too, have seen the light. While the rest of the population has turned to liturgicized Catholicism, housebroken revivalism and neo-orthodox Reform Judaism, the artists have gone for Zen. The reason for this is that they don't know any Zen Buddhists, who, I take it on faith, are really just as bad as Christians and Jews but have the immense advantage of absence.

Zen also has a more direct connection with abstract expressionism in its "third state" of consciousness, which seems to correspond roughly to the unitive way in Christian mysticism. The mystical merging of individual consciousness with pure being is thought to resemble, the retreat from consciousness or the trance-like in which some abstract expressionist works are said to be produced. As a west coast man with trans-Pacific interests Graves is considered to be closer to Zen—by about 3000 miles—than most of the New York school. Hence he gets in even though he does draw superbly.

GRAVES' DRAWINGS do have an undeniable Oriental air about them. This comes partly from his materials and tools and partly from his very subjects: by and large western artists do not take animals as seriously as Graves does. Using sumi ink and a broad calligraphic brush, Graves can achieve the living outline of a bird on paper with the look of being done in a single gesture. With more, delicate brushes, he sometimes articulates the image with both form and surface shadings. The space around the figures is part of the total composition and the rich but subtle textures of his Oriental papers add measurably to the experience of his work.

A few of the pieces in Graves' Chicago show aim at something more than the purity of the drawings and the results are mixed. A horizontal painting of a Samurai sword rusting in the grass seems to profit both from the increased complexity of composition and from artistic comment beyond the simple "Look!" of the drawings. On the other hand, "Symbols," simply seems cluttered, both compositionally and intellectually, with odds and ends of Miro, Chagall and Tobey. "Winter's Leaves" I found the most thoroughly satisfying of the larger efforts. A dark ground is created out of stains and creases and a very narrow range of blacks and browns. Faint white lines that seem almost scratched into the paper suggest the leaves and the course of the wind. It's a haunting, lovely work.

Another good draughtsman showing in Chicago now is Conger Metcalf at the Main Street Bookstore. Metcalf draws in a late Renaissance tradition of clarity, modelling, and a well defined line. He is very much aware of his drawing, sometimes too much so. The only really bad example of this trait in his Chicago show is a take-off on Matisse, in which the familiar flat form is adorned with three or four small objects "rendered," in the three dimensional sense, so that they bounce against the Matisse manner. In the inevitable conflict, it isn't Matisse who suffers from the comparison.

DRAWING is the subject of roughly one half of the paintings at the Bookstore. These take the form of Italian street boys doing pavement art or copying one another's features. Metcalf uses a golden light and he uses it in pretty much the way Caravaggio did when he invented controlled stage lighting two and a half centuries before electricity.

The Caravaggio reference, which is inescapable in the way Metcalf focuses sharp light on limbs and faces is perhaps unfortunate. Caravaggio was a thorough going realist; his pitiless light was an apt symbol of a hard clear-headed attitude toward life. Emotionally it is as if Metcalf had wired that light through rheostats in order to manipulate the feelings of the viewer. Thus the central image of art, Italy and poor boys with spiritual riches is slightly schmaltz, not only because the elements pre-exist with built-in responses for most of us, but also because the beautifully controlled line and the expertly placed amber baby spot are almost abstractions of exactly the same pre-fabricated reaction. Metcalf relies on the same combination in his other chief subject, which is the American strip tease artist presented as played out and pitiable, in repose rather than in action. For all these reservations there's a lot of talent and a lot of truth in Metcalf's work. "Queenie," for example, has the ravaged face and flabby torso of an old bag with legs that can trip down the runaway forever.

FRANK GETLEIN

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THEATRE

A Literate Soap Opera

THIS is not quite so much a review as it is an out-and-out eulogy for *The Dark at the Top of the Stairs*, the new William Inge play currently on view at the Music Box.

Mr. Inge is a writer of literate soap opera. His *Picnic* dealt with a gaggle of lonely Kansas females suddenly electrified by the arrival of a handsome no-good who represented sex-on-the-hoof to their dreary milieu. *Bus Stop* offered an oddly assorted package of troubled travellers, stranded in a Kansas lunch

The Dark at the Top of the Stairs, by William Inge (Music Box).

room just long enough to work everything out. *The Dark at the Top of the Stairs* takes us to neighboring Oklahoma to worry with the problems of the Flood family, which seem—for a while—fairly insurmountable. This is in no way intended to deprecate Mr. Inge's work, for his soap is of the best French-milled quality. His writing is adult. He is incapable of schmaltz. His characters are funny where he wants them to be funny, sad where he wants them to be sad and always touching and understandable. So much for Mr. Inge.

The Dark at the Top of the Stairs deals with quite a lot of everything and not with very much of any one thing. Mostly the play concerns Cora Flood (Teresa Wright) who for seventeen years has been involved in an almost entirely physical marriage to a partially domesticated ex-cowboy, several cuts beneath her on the intellectual scale. Mr. Flood, now off the range and barely able to support his wife and children as a harness salesman, is afflicted with a roving eye—especially for a lady named Mavis in Ponca City. The play opens with one of the worst of the Floods' many quarrels as the breadwinner sets out on a selling trip that threatens to be the beginning of a permanent separation.

Most of Cora's troubles are of her own making. In her not unnatural desire for middle class respectability and to establish her young among the local gentry, she has gradually withdrawn from her virile husband—although heartsick about his infidelities—and focused all of her love and attention upon her two children. And a sorry mess Mrs. Flood has made of it. Her beautiful 16-year-old daughter is shy to the point of hysteria, happy only in such lonely pursuits as practicing at the piano and reading at the public library. She is sick to the point of nausea at having to attend a rich girl's dance at the country club. The younger son is spoiled, precocious and woefully oedipal. Understandably unpopular with his contemporaries, he lives in a private little world of his own, memorizing "pieces," going alone to the movies, collecting pictures of film stars and flirting outrageously with his mother and his aunt.

In bald, soap operatic terms, The Problem would be this: Now that Cora has lost her husband and unwittingly ruined her children, how is she going to get out of this fix? That is not a very original dilemma, but of course it's not the *real* problem at all. What actually matters is the total lack of communication that tortures the husband, the wife and the children. Fears, timidities, misunderstandings and grudges that smoldered unspoken for years have brought the Floods to their present predicament and what does matter is how these obstacles are overcome. I suppose that if everybody had laid his cards on the table before Act One, there wouldn't have been any play. But under the circumstances, I'm glad they didn't.

The cast is uniformly excellent—so good, in fact, that one is almost seduced into writing a little essay about each actor. Teresa Wright, back from Hollywood, is lovely and moving as the harrassed wife and mother, who realizes just in time that she is losing her husband and smothering her children. Pat Hingle is wonderfully convincing as her unlettered, sexy husband—a role not calculated to create a great deal of sympathy. As Lottie Lacey, Miss Wright's flibberty-gibbet sister from Oklahoma City, Eileen Heckart is a triumph of earthiness, vulgarity and downright gab. Frank Overton is a monument of mute misery as Miss Heckert's dentist husband.

Ben Edwards' setting, a middle class, middlewestern living room of the early Twenties is straight out of *The Modern Priscilla* and Lucinda Ballard's costumes are just as perfect, in their horrible, but subtly colorful, way. And here again, one must admire the artistry of Mr. Inge, for he has given a perfect feeling of the period without bludgeoning the audience with Charlestons, hip flasks and references to bobbed hair. All of these things are in *The Dark at the Top of the Stairs*, but they are brought in naturally and because they belong there.

All in all, *The Dark at the Top of the Stairs* is a remarkably satisfactory play. I suggest that you get to it before Hollywood does.

PATRICK DENNIS

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

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MOVIES

Germans in the Looking-Glass

THE TRUTH of Shakespeare's definition of art as a mirror held up to nature lies in the fact that man's nature involves not only his actions and his ideas but his fantasies as well. Certain poor works of art are particularly useful for capturing the fantasies better than the facts. The German film called *Rotation* is one of these. It is touted as a portrait of an "average German family before, during, and after Hitler's time." *Rotation* is a "domestic" film—an unlikely item for export—because it does not take cognizance of the existence of anything or anybody outside of German consciousness.

The plot line is a family history. An ordinary man, after the First World War, falls in love, gets the girl pregnant and marries her. They live in poverty but are happy in their family and friends. Times get worse and the husband cannot find a job. The wife's Communist brother predicts worse to come, but their Nazi friend is an optimist. The situation is desperate until the husband takes a job in the printing plant of the Nazi party newspaper. He is not a Nazi, but he "falls into line" for the sake of food and clothes and an apartment. His son is educated in a Nazi school, and his Jewish neighbors are taken away. Gradually the swastika button appears on the lapel; a portrait of Hitler on the living room wall. But it is only when the war brings the bombings home that evil at close quarters is felt to pinch. The Communist brother-in-law persuades him to print a handbill against "Hitler's War." The son finds a hidden copy of it. The brother-in-law is captured, tortured, and murdered. When this news reaches the family the husband smashes the photograph of der Führer with an ashtray. His horrified son reports him and the father is put into a concentration camp. While he awaits execution during the final torments of Hitler's Berlin, the wife escapes drowning in a flooded air-raid shelter only to be shot to death in the streets. The son is deserted by his erstwhile Jungen-leader who saves his own skin. The husband is rescued from the firing squad by the arriving Russians. In the end, the son returns asking forgiveness, which the father heartbreakingly gives him. And the last scene is a repetition by the son and his girl friend of the father and mother's earliest romantic meeting.

This film is not an ironic attempt to accuse those who say: "I'm not to blame; all I did was follow orders." On the contrary, *Rotation* offers the picture of a man who is to blame even though he did not follow the orders entirely. He only "fell into line" because he wanted to care for his wife and child. He is a man devoid of politics; that is, he abstains from having political principles. He is the "natural man" who wants to be left alone to earn a living and enjoy private life. It is only when the conditions of public life prevent this that he realizes he is more than a private person —he is a citizen, and a citizen of a state with very clearly articulated principles. He may disregard them or make light of them but, when the representatives of the Nazis pull the strings, he jumps the way they want him to jump. When his Jewish neighbors are carried away in a truck, all he can do is close the window to shut out the sight. The lesson that one's private life cannot be kept "good" while one's public life is "evil" comes home to him only when his own son betrays him.

As in any tragic drama, the compensations are excluded. No satisfaction in the Nazi military victories is indicated. In fact, no awareness of the war beyond the border of Berlin itself is felt. This ordinary man doesn't count his satisfactions and his suffering in the statistics of conquest: the film would make it seem that they played no part in his life. Consequently, what *his* government caused to happen to the world beyond the borders of Germany doesn't enter into the picture, and he feels no relation to it. The rest of Europe doesn't exist for him. He has enough trouble repairing the bomb damage to his apartment.

The primary effect of the film is its indictment of the German leaders. This is painfully epitomized in the climaxing scene when a Nazi commander orders a bridge to be blown up despite his knowledge that this, a hopeless gesture in the last hours of the battle for Berlin, will cause a flood in a subway station where thousands of children, women, and old men have taken refuge. The following scene is doubly terrifying with suffering and awareness of the meaningfulness of such misery. Although it is entirely out of proportion to the development of the plot, it stands in perfect consistency with the theme of German condemnation of their Nazi leaders. "See," it says, "this is the depth of Hell that you brought us to: the pointless destruction of *our own* people."

The sense of "the Hell you Nazis brought on *other* people" is not present in the film. But then the horizon of its protagonist is not wide enough to include that view. Except in this sense: he has faced a firing squad and survived. In effect, he comes back from the dead. Literally, he had read the writing on the wall of his death cell: the signs of the Jews, the French, the Poles who had gone to their death from that room. When his son returns to ask forgiveness he can say that forgiveness is what we must all ask for. His salvation comes by taking the responsibility partly on himself. He can feel "this isn't what I wanted at all," but he knows "I didn't do anything to prevent it."

Rotation presents the tragic situation of the man who pretended not to understand the principles involved and who did not do anything to stop what happened. He accepted the advantages of Nazism and wishfully imagined that he would not have to pay for them. Because of his passivity, what he suffered was not transformed into tragedy. Except for the small expansion of himself which allows him to identify with other sufferers, you are offered a vision of only mute exasperation and frustration.

MILTON MAYER calls his book about those Germans who "went along with" the Nazis *They Thought They Were Free*. That is, if they thought about their situation at all. But this film, *Rotation*, reminds you that those among us who feel "non-political" can only be victims of the stronger-willed because there is no living independent of our political organizations. We are either with them, or *consciously* against them. Those of us who refuse to think about it, or delude ourselves with fantasies that the Big Men will take care of everything for us, and ask nothing in return, expose ourselves to the animal rotation of helplessness, suffering, and passive guilt.

MORRIS PHILIPSON

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Open Letter to a Record Club

SIX MONTHS AGO, I was almost as enthusiastic as my wife was when she borrowed a dime from me and told me it would buy us a 12-inch long-playing record containing an Offenbach *Can Can; The Flight of The Bumble Bee,* that march from *Aida,* and several other "popular classics."

I studied the small print in the offer and liked everything I saw. My wife would be sent announcement of forthcoming selections long enough in advance for her to send a printed rejection slip back to you. She wouldn't have to choose any specific number of records and she could resign any time she wanted. Your prices were reasonable. There seemed to be no strings attached.

My wife mailed you my dime and I must say that you lived up to every obligation. We rejected some of your selections, bought others. Thanks to you, we have added to our collection several good records—ranging from Rachmaninoff and Strauss to Josh White singing *One Meat Ball.*

Perhaps you think I'm a sucker for urging my wife to resign. I'd think so too if you hadn't lent or sold my wife's name to every sucker list in New York City.

Apparently you have some composite picture of what your typical member is like, because soon after my wife joined you, she began to receive all sorts of mail containing:

1. Special discounts on gardening and home-decorating books.

2. Pre-publication offers on child psychology texts.

3. A plan for subscribing to a portfolio of Van Gogh paintings specially selected by Kirk Douglas.

We could tell that these offers were from you or your friends: the envelopes bore my wife's membership number in your club. Still, the books seemed quite worthwhile, and, as for the paintings, Kirk Douglas did play Van Gogh in the movies. He should know what's good.

Unfortunately, we live in a furnished efficiency apartment; there is no room for gardening on our wall-to-wall carpeting; the home-decorating is done by the management, and we have strict orders ot lay off the walls. As it is, they're trying to take away our 83-cent Utrillo reproduction because we're already over the painting limit. Child psychology is out of the question because we don't have any kids — besides, children and pets are forbidden by the lease.

I'm sure you see my wife as Mom raising our 2&7/8 children by The Book while Dad putters around the garden humming along as your music seeps through the picture window. At night, you see us studying your offers in a living room decorated by Van Gogh. The Hi-Fi, of course, is playing *One Meat Ball.*

We haven't wanted to spoil your illusion; we're been willing to string along. But the other day we received a letter that has brought you and us to a parting of ways. Although the letter was signed by a famous woman novelist, the envelope bore my wife's membership number and the inscription: "Ask your doctor about this message . . . "

The letter inside read:

> My dear friend:
>
> Please forgive this intimate greeting. But my message is highly personal and, in my concern about the problems of *marital happiness,* I do feel that I am acting as your dear friend.
>
> A few days ago, I finished reading the book described in the enclosed announcement. (*Then follows the title of a book on women's sexual responsibility.*)
>
> At last I know exactly how I have failed my husband. Already I have taken steps to correct some of my errors. What a profound, tremendous difference it is making in the happiness of both of us.
>
> I mistakenly thought we had been fairly content. Now for the first time, I know we are blissfully happy. I see it in my husband's eyes. I feel it in his every gesture—his warm embrace . . .
>
> . . . I send you this invitation to secure this book because if it makes 1/10 the difference in your life that it has made in mine, I know you will be everlastingly grateful . . . etc., etc.

I'm not sure what a husband's rights are in such matters, but I hereby tender my wife's resignation from your club.

ALAN LEVY

Notes on Contributors

CHARLES L. BLACK, JR. is on the faculty of the Yale Law School. HENRY POPKIN is drama critic of *Prospectus.* HAROLD WITT's first book of poems will be published in the spring. PATRICK DENNIS is the author of *Auntie Mame.* MORRIS PHILIPSON is on the faculty of Hunter College. ALAN LEVY is a co-author of *A Draftee's Confidential Guide.*

A Communication

(Continued from page 3)

with the Russians. Negotiations may on occasion be fruitful; they may be necessary and advisable. But not right now, because we are now "in an unfavorable position to ask for or to successfully engage in any such negotiations." So, first, we've got to get back to where we were, ahead of the Russians, and then we'll be ready to talk.

This has, of course, been the American formula right along. But though we have enjoyed a position we would now call strong we exhibited no irresistible compulsion for negotiations. Strength in this kind of world is not easy to be 100 percent sure of. If we were ahead of the Russians in nuclear weapons, how did we compare in conventional arms and in manpower? Were our arms and men in the right places? Were our allies and recent enemies solid enough, secure enough, armed enough? We have alternated between bragging of how far ahead we were (the complacency which the *NR* and practically everybody else are busy decrying) and deploring the tenuousness of our advantage. When we were bragging we were certainly in no mood to negotiate with the Russians. What for, with everything going our way? And anyway how were we to be sure that our estimate of superiority was not a complacent delusion resulting from faulty Intelligence? And in our negative moods, usually around appropriation times, we knew better than to negotiate. How could we? We would be bargaining from weakness or at any rate from relative weakness.

And then there were always the other —absolute and therefore constant—reasons to fall back on for a non-negotiating policy. The Russians never negotiated; they stalled and dodged and delayed; they used the negotiations for propaganda; they did not want an agree-

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ment; negotiations buoyed up the hopes of the world and then dashed them to bits; and anyway if an agreement ever came out of it, it was worthless because the Russians would never keep their word. Since some kind of a case could be made for each of these reasons, the Radford position makes more sense, an insane sense to be sure, than a policy of waiting for a conviction of strength which we can never be absolutely certain is not complacency.

If a settlement is conceivable, how can it be brought about except by negotiating with the Russians? Is there some other Russian regime or some other power with which we prefer to negotiate and with which it would make any sense to negotiate? But, says the *NR*, though it must be with the Russians that we negotiate, we dare not do it except from strength. Equal strength or greater strength? But why negotiate when we are only the equal of the enemy? Another push, another crash program, and we can be ahead. Yet what if the Russians insist also on bargaining from strength? So that negotiations are possible for us only when they are impossible for them, and vice versa. Unless there were an absolute point of equilibrium. . . .

War, we are told, has been made impossible by our weapons. So we need more and more and more of them. Peace we are told is impossible until we have enough of them. But since the other side is making them too there can never be enough of them. And if we ever thought we had enough, that would again be complacency, an all too possible condition which leads to breastbeating, despair, investigations, and a new crash program to make more and more and more of them, faster and faster. Let us take Venus, but what if the Russians take Mars, and what's Venus to Mars? Nothing doing, no negotiations until the Saturnians let us stick our missile bases all over their planet. The trouble, of course, is that the Saturnians like the West Europeans may not want our missiles to make them targets for Russian missiles. What bargaining strength will we have if our allies pressure us into negotiations? Or if they start negotiating themselves?

BEN SHRAGO

Cincinnati, Ohio

. . . and in reply

LINES of communication between the US and the USSR are not clogged (as they unfortunately are between the US and Communist China). We are not where we are because of the absence of contact but because of the absence of agreement on terms for "a settlement." To us, therefore the pertinent question is not whether there is to be negotiation, that is to say diplomacy, but what kind and on what level?

Should the US, for example, accept Khrushchev's invitation to "summit" talks between only this country and the Soviets? We think not, and not merely because the US is presently in a seriously disadvantageous position from which to bargain: our government has neither the right nor the authority to settle the futures of our allies without their direct participation in the settling process; moreover, the principal result of such a meeting now, in our opinion, would be a wider acceptance of the myth that the US is the leader of one "bloc" (reactionary, capitalist, war-minded), while the USSR is the leader of the other "bloc" (socialist, peace-loving).

Should we, perhaps, take seriously Khrushchev's other current proposal—for a meeting between "capitalist" and "socialist" states? How can we? Who would decide which is what, since the US is not "capitalist" as Khrushchev understands that word, and the Russians are hardly "socialist" as we understand that word?

What then of the foreign ministers conference? This could, we believe, prove fruitful, *if* such a conference were preceded by a detailed exchange of views between working parties which conducted their talks behind closed doors, and if this private exchange gave promise of progress on specific items. But, a foreign ministers meeting has just been turned down by Gromyko, who calls the idea "sterile." (It evidently was not "sterile" when the Russians proposed it last February, which illustrates how time changes values—time and Sputniks).

What matters most it seems to us is not when or where we talk but what we say. *The New Republic* has argued long and hard for drastic alterations in US foreign policy which, side by side with adequate defense measures, might make it possible to come to terms with the USSR on certain questions. We take Lester Pearson's view that not only must "we keep . . . our defensive coalition firm in its collective will and power, but we should take full advantage of every opportunity to negotiate; *indeed create opportunities* to negotiate differences with those whom we have had, and still have good reason to fear."

But we frankly admit that we have little confidence that the US will create such opportunities so long as Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles are in charge. And we don't know what can be done about that for the time being.

THE EDITORS

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